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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS FAIRBANKS CLOSE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ALLENE CLOSE ADAMS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
18204 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from a Final Judgment of the 
Second Judicial District Court for 
Dav~s County, ·state of btah 
HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY 
District Court Judge 
LYLE J. BARNES, ESQ. 
Villager Professional Building 
47 North Main, Suite #1 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
(Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant) 
PETE N. VLAHOS 
VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent) 
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IN THE SUPRHAE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 










SUPREME COURT NO. 
18204 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This Appeal is made by the Appellant from the final 
Order of the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge of the 
District Court in and for the Second Judicial District 
Court, County of Davis, State of Utah, making a Judgment and 
finding that it was the intent of the decedent, Edi th 
Branscomb, to leave her Estate equally between the Appellant 
and the Respondent, who were her son and daughter, and the 
·sole heirs of the decedent, who died intestate. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court decreed that the assets left by the decedent, 
being her home and certain stocks, that one-half of the 
total value of the Estate shall go to each of the children, 
being the Respondent and the Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks that the equitable Judgment of the 
Lower Court be upheld, and that the intestate estate shall 
be divided equally between the sole surviving heirs and 
beneficiaries of the decedent, namely that .the Appel 1 ant and 
Respondent shall each share equally in the estate of the 
decedent. 
STATaAENT OF FACTS 
Edi th Branscomb, who was the mother of the Appellant 
and the Respondent, will hereinafter be referred to as the 
'Mother", and Douglas Fairbanks Close, who was the plaintiff 
in the Lower Court and is the Appellant in the matter before 
this Court will be referred to as the "Son", and Allene 
Close Adams, who was the defendant in the Lower Court and is 
the Respondent in the matter before this Court will be 
referred to as the "Daughter". 
RESPONDENT'S BHIEF 2 
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The Mother became demised on December 26, 1977, at the 
age of 90 years. (T. 120) (R. 43) 
In 19 6 2, the Mother desired to prevent probate, and 
conveyed her home to be held in joint tenancy with herself 
and her Daug·hter. (T. 207) At the same time, the Mother 
conveyed 740 shares of Utah Power & Light Stock, which was 
the only other remaining assets which she had, to her 
Son. (T. 207) At the time of the conveyance of the Utah 
Power & Light Stock, the 740 shares had a value in 1962 of 
$29,100.00. (R. 39) 
The Court made a finding in the Lower Court, from the 
testimony that was given, that the nature of what the 
decedent was doing was transferring the property, so that 
she could avoid probate, by distributing her property to 
those who meant the most to her, and to whom she thought 
ought to have the property, and that the issuing of a 
Warranty Deed to the Daughter and the 740 shares of stock to 
the Son, was at that time a fair and equitable distribution 
of the property to her two sole surviving beneficiaries, her 
two children. (R. 19 5) 
The Mother, while re~overing from a series of strokes, 
commencing October 4~. 1975, and continuing into March, 
1977 (R. 94-99) , when 89 years of age, did on July 29, 1977, 
give a Quit Claim Deed to the home which she shared in joint 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 3 
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tenancy with her Daughter, to the Son (R. 55), who now seeks 
to claim one-half of the real property, and all of the Utah 
I 
Power.& Light Stock, which at the time of the demise of the 
Mother, was 1,440 shares of Utah Power & Light Stock, with 
only one-half of the real property going to the Daughter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE APPELLANT, DOUGLAS CLOSE, IS THE 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEE OF THE EQUITABLE SHARE 
OF THEIR MOTHER'S ESTATE, INTENDED TO BE 
DEVISED AND BEQUEATHED TO HIS SISTER. 
The Mother, did in 1962, convey the assets of her 
Estate to her only two children and benef.iciaries, namely 
the Appellant and the Respondent, by conveying the 740 
shares of Utah Power & Light Stock to the Son (now through a 
stock split being 1,480 shares), and by her intent to convey 
the home and real property to her Daughter, by creating a 
joint tenancy of the property by a deed to herself and her 
Daughter. (T. 207, 208) The Mother had a cerebral vascular 
accident in September; 1975, at the age of 87 years. (See 
Records attached to R. 46) The Mother was transferred to a 
rehabilition ward under the care of Dr. Bender, and was 
subsequently discharged for complete twenty-four hour care 
in her home. The Mother was re-admitted again in January, 
19 7 7 , for add i t i on al comp l i ca t i on s and s t r o k e , and she was 
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discharged on February 3, 1977, by her attending physician, 
Dr. Basil Williams, still suffering from numbness over the 
entire left side of her body. She remained under the direct 
care of Dr. Basil Williams until she was transferred to a 
rehabilitation unit under Dr. John Bender at the McKay-Dee 
Hospital. (See Records attached to R. 46) 
Subsequent to her re-admission on January 16, 1977, by 
Dr. Williams, the medical records evidence as follows: 
The patient is a weak lethargic white 
female, lying in bed who does not appear 
to be in acute distress, who is unable 
to give a medical history, but who will 
respond sl uggi shl y to verbal commands, 
and makes an effort to cooperate. 
The patient in thjs admission· was 90 yea.rs of ageo The 
report of the neurologist brought in for prognosis was Dr. 
G. T. Blanch, who stated: 
The patient is arousible and wi 11 
attempt to answer questions, but cannot 
provide a history. She has left facial 
weakness, signs of left hemiparesis. 
She is hyper, reflexic on the left side, 
with respect to the right. 
The opinion of Dr .. John Bender, in the Hospital Records 
as of January. 24~ 1977, stated: 
At this. poin~t, ·M.rs o Branscomb appears to 
require a great deal of nursing care, 
and her capabilities for improvement are 
somewhat uncertaino She may be a can-
didate of a ·more prolonged hospital 
rehab i 1 i tat ion program, but the family 
and home assistance can provide 
increased personal care to this woman. 
RESPONUENT'S BRIEF 5 
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The Hospital Records from January 28, 1977, state: 
Slight but generalized cognitive 
deficits. These deficits are probably 
residuals from the previous C. V. A. and 
also age. Specific problems include 
rambling conversation, poor judgment, 
inability to understand current situ-
ations, even after situations have been 
explained, and short-term memory loss. 





is slightly disoriented, 
will cooperate to some 
Dr. Williams, in the request ~or medical records from 
the counsel for the Respondent, made a prognosis regarding 
the condition of the Mother, wherein Dr. Basil Williams 
stated: 
I did not see her again fol lowing that 
time (January, 1977). It was my feeling 
t ha t fr om the t ime of her s t r ok e un t i 1 
her demise that she was not competent to 
make sound decisions, and was relying 
upon her family to make decisions for 
her. The severity of her neurological 
deficit and impairment of her 
intellectual capacities, make me believe 
that any decisions she made after 
September 3 0, · 19 7 5, cannot be regarded 
as valid. (Exhibits attached to R. 46) 
The Mother, upon her discharge on February 3, 1977, 
following her admitance on January 16, 1977 (T. 9~ was 
released for home care, subject to her being provided 
twenty-four-hour-a-day assistance (T. 107). She was not 
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seen again by Dr. Bender from March 24th until her demise in 
Dec ember , 19 7 7 . ( T . 1 O 7 , T . 10 0) 
Janice Arnold was employed to care for the Mother, and 
did care for her for two years from 1975 to the demise of 
the Mother in 1977 (T 166, 177). Mrs. Arnold lived in with 
the Mother from Sunday evening until Friday night each week, 
at which time the Daughter would move in on Friday evening 
and stay until Sunday morning, caring for her Mother, with 
the Son coming in on Sunday during the daytime, and staying 
until Mrs. Arnold would again take up her weekly chore of 
caring for the Moth~r, commencing Sunday eveninge (T. 118) 
Mrs. Arnold observed that the rviother's "mind kept failing 
the last year u. (T 121) 
Mrs. Arno! d be 1 ieved that the l\lo ther 's men ta I cond i-
t ion, as to comprehension, got worse the last six months 
prior to her demise (T. 121); that there were times that the 
Mother did not know what she was doing (T. 123); and that 
the Mother was unable to call her Daughter by her name and 
Mrs. Arnold did not know ~f she was recognizing her Daughter 
or not. (T. 124) 
The Quit Claim Deed to the ·Son, made by the Mother, 
which conveyed away the joint tenancy rights of the Daughter 
to the Son was on a Friday, July 29, 1977, and the Deed was 
prepared by someone not identified, at the time when the Son 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 7 
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and his wife were present, and out of the presence of Mrs. 
Arnold, with the wife of the Appellant acting as a witness 
to the Quit Claim Deed, · and a Mrs. Engerman acting as a 
Notary. (T. 112) Mrs. Engerman had been cal led to come to 
the home to notarize a paper for the Mother, receiving a 
call about 6:00 or 6:30 p.m., and could not identify the 
person who had called her. (T. 109-111) 
At the time that Mrs. Engerman arrived at the Mother's 
home, the Appellant and his wife were both in the room with 
the Mother, and neither Mrs. Arnold nor the Respondent were 
present at the t ime of the vi s i t of the App e 1 1 ant and hi s 
wife with the Mother, nor at the time of the signing of the 
already prepared Deed, by the Mother, wherein a transfer of 
the property was made (T. 115), approximately five months 
prior to the demise of the Mother. The Mother was 90 years 
of age at the time of said transfer. 
In Haus v. ~~~~~~' 209 P.2d 229 (1949), the Utah 
Supreme Court held constructive trusts as an equitable 
remedy and arises by operation of law, and is not within the 
statute of frauds, but is found to exist when necessary to 
prevent unjust enrichment. 
In the case of ~ei~~~!~ !~ ~~l~~~~' 164 N.E. 545, 540 
(1928), Justice Cardoza held, while serving on the New Your 
Court of Appeals: 
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A constructive trust is, then, the 
remedial device through which preference 
o f s e 1 f i s made sub o rd i n a t e to 1oya1 t Y 
to others. 
In ~ea!!~ v. ~ugg~~~~!~ ~!El~!~!!~~ ~omE~~~' 122 
N.E. 378, 380, Justice Cardoza, while serving on the New 
York Court of Appeals stated: 
A constructive trust is a formula 
through which the conscience of equity 
finds expression. When property has 
been acquired in such circumstances that 
the holder of the legal title may not in 
good conscience retain the beneficial 
interest, equity converts him into a 
trustee. 
In ~or~~~~ !..:.. !Yis~~_!_!, 436 P.2d 922 (1968), the Court 
held that constructive trusts do not arise by agreement or 
from the intention of the parties, but by operation of law. 
That by operation of law and being limitless in form are 
raised by courts of equity where necessary to effectuate 
justice and prevent inequity and unjust enrichment. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in ~hi!.!!E~ !..:.. ~~.!__!, 358 
P. 2d 193 ( 1960), held that where a party obtains legal title 
to property by a violation of confidence or in any other 
unconsciounable manner, equity will impress upon that party 
a constructive trust in the property so obtained, for the 
one who, in good conscience, is entitlec;:l to the property. 
Further, it was found that the· defendant, being unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff was entitled by 
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virtue of the doctrines of estoppel or unjust enrichment to 
have an equitable lien placed upon the property. 
In the instant matter before the Court, we have the 
unquestioned intent of the Mother to convey the Utah Power & 
Light Stock to her Son, and the home to her Daughter, as a 
method of evading probate and to equitably divide her Estate 
between her only two children, and then five months prior to 
her demise, at a time she was 90 years of age, and had 
suffered a number of strokes, requiring twenty-four-a-day 
constant care, on July 29, 1977, just five months prior to 
her demise, the Mother signs a Quit Claim Deed with her Son 
and the Son's sp-0use present, and having excluded Mrs. 
Arnold and visiting the Mother on a day when the Daughter is 
also not present, a Notary Public, and then an already-
prepared Deed was presented to the Mother for her signature, 
to convey the Mother's interest in the property as a joint 
tenant to the Son, and the Son's wife is asked to sign as a 
witness, not Mrs. Arnold, and now the Son is not only the 
possessor of the 1,480 shares of stock in the Utah Power & 
Light, from which he has personally received and benefited 
from all of the dividends and stock splits, since 1962, but 
is now also a one-half owner of the home. 
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The testimony of Mrs. Arnold, is set forth under oath 
as follows: 
. Q. Now let me ask you. Did you ever 
have a conversation with r.irs. 
Branscomb (the Mother) concerning 
the home and to whom it belonged 
to? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was this 
year period 





Q. What did she say about the home? 
A. She told me that she had given her 
home to her daughter, Mrs. Adams, 
and she told me that all the two 
ye a rs . ( T . 12 1) 
The entire record before· the· Court evidences no grasp-
ing, greed or avariciousness on the part of the Daughter, 
but to the contrary, her examination by attorney for the 
Appellant, evidences her feelings in the following dialogue: 
A. You are asking that the court do 
one of two things, Mrs. Adams. You 
are asking that the court either 
take the stock and the home and 
divide them equally between you and 
your brother, take all the stock 
and the home,· add it up and divide 
it equally; or your brother keep 
the stock and you keep the home; is 
that correct? 
A$ I guess you can say it that way. 
Q. OK. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 11 
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A. I have always felt like the stock 
should have been his because that 
is what my mother decided, but she 
also decided I should have the 
home, but I don't know. 
( T • 2 10 - 2 11) 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the Lower Court, as a Court of 
equity, had a duty and the right to make an equitable dis-
tribution of assets to prevent unconscionable distribution_ 
of the Estate, and to carry out the original intent of the 
decedent Mother, and that the equal division of the Estate 
by giving to the Son .and the Daughter one-half of the home, 
and each one-half of the Utah Power & Light Stocks, without 
requiring the Son to return any of the dividends which he 
received from the stock from 1962 to 1981, was a fair and 
equitable distribution in carrying out the intent of 
decedent Mother to her only two children, both of whom she 
loved. Equity and unjust enrichment requires affirming the 
judgment of the Lower Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .:::Z_f: day of April, 1982. 
VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP 
·-/,./ 
sy·.. ___. "'~----7~_.,_ 
PETE- .- vtf8os~-01-tfie- Irm~~-~ 
Attorneys for Res. onden t 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _2g' day of April, 1982, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
document, by placing same in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Lyle J. Barnes, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
Villager Professional Building 
47 North Main, Suite #1 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
(Attorney for Appellant) 
~~. H <U 
- -~'/ A )., ,J ,?,...,,. J _ __/ft/);, ( / _v.::-_~_!~ ~ sEcRETARY ___________ u -----------
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